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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF COLLISIONS
BETWEEN RADAR EQUIPPED SHIPS
KENNETH H. VOLK7*
The advent of radar was hailed as one of the greatest advances in
maritime history. The merchant fleets of the world welcomed this
modern scientific development in the hope that safer and even collision-
free navigation would now be possible. But after more than a decade
since radar became available to merchantmen we find that the anticipated
increase in safety has not been altogether realized. In 1956 there were
over 1,500 collisions throughout the world involving vessels of more than
500 tons,' an increase of about 29% over 1946.2 Of the 51 major
collisions in 1956 listed by the Liverpool Underwriters Association, in-
cluded within which number was the much heralded collision between
the Stockholm and the Andrea Doria, 78.4% involved vessels equipped
with radar.
3
This is indeed a somewhat disillusioning record. An examination of
court decisions concerning collisions at sea involving radar-equipped
vessels appears to be in order so that we may learn, if we can, the
nature of these collisions, the role played by radar in them, and the
legal effect that radar has in determining fault.
A general conclusion reached from a study of these cases must be
set forth at the outset. Increased safety at sea is not wanting because
of any failure on the part of radar. It is rather the failure of those who
use it to appreciate its limitations as well as its advantages. Indeed it
* Member of the New York Bar.
'Liverpool Underwriters Association report on casualties to motor and steam
vessels of 500 tons gross register and up which have been posted in the Loss Boo.
Figures for the years 1944 through 1956 are as follows:
Collision Collision
Total Partial Total Partial
Loss Loss Total Loss Loss Total
1944 23 1377 1400 1951 11 1624 1635
1945 14 1350 1364 1952 11 1624 1634
1946 13 1167 1180 (sic)
1947 11 1455 1466 1953 18 1545 1563
1948 5 1488 1493 1954 6 1368 1374
1949 12 1244 1256 1955 23 1489 1512
1950 6 1271 1277 1956 14 1506 1520
'There has, of course, been a corresponding increase in the size of the world
merchant fleet. According to LLoy''s REGISTER OF SHIPPING (Register Books
1947-56), there were 17,259 vessels of over 500 tons in 1947. In 1956 the figure
was 20,289, or an increase of 17.5%.
"According to LLoYD's REGIsTR OF SHIPPING (Register Book 1956), one or
both vessels involved in 40 of these collisions carried radar. In 21 both ships had
radar and in 19 radar was installed on only one of the vessels.
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appears that in many instances too much reliance has been put on radar
without the necessary underlying comprehension of its value. There
have been numerous collisions caused by an almost blind dependence on
radar to act as a sort of invisible shield to protect the ship from
danger. 4 It is sad to acknowledge that in many instances, if it had not
been for radar, there would have been no collision.5
One of the causes then for these collisions is a lack of appreciation
of radar's capacity. Radar, to be of any assistance at all in navigating
a vessel, must be properly used. That is, the information this instrument
presents requires interpretation and understanding on the part of the
watch officer. It is a common misconception among laymen and perhaps
among some deck watch officers as well that radar is a type of television
which will give an instantaneous picture of everything, moving or sta-
tionary, around the ship. This is not so. First, an echo or pip appears
merely as a spot of light on the radarscope and is not immediately identi-
fiable. It may be another ship, or it may be a lighthouse, an iceberg,
or some other object. The radarscope won't tell you. Further, even
when the object is identified as a ship, a single echo will not show
which way she is headed or her speed. Second, because of radar's line
of sight characteristics, large intervening objects will conceal objects
behind them, and also objects over the horizon will usually not be de-
tected. Third, two objects at the same range and bearing, such as a
ship under a bridge, cannot be readily distinguished, but will appear to
be only a single echo and therefore the ship may remain hidden on the
radarscope. And fourth, low-lying objects, particularly small wooden
craft, are sometimes impossible to detect because of sea conditions and
the characteristics of the radar wave.
These limitations are inherent in radar and will remain constant
regardless of technological advances in the other aspects. Radar manu-
facturers are continuously improving their equipment with a special
emphasis on ease and accuracy of interpreting information received on
the PPI scope.6 Such improvements, however, will not remove the
"'I think the pilot was at fault, on that fine summer's night, in paying so much
attention to radar, and so little to what his eyes could have seen ahead of his
vessel." Gratsos v. The Baranof, [1953] Can. Exch. 74, 81, 1953 A.M.C. 393, 400.
"Although the captain disavowed such reliance [upon radar], the pilot admitted
that if the radar had not been in operation speed would have been reduced." Wood
v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 42, 50 (S. D. N. Y. 1954). ".. . [T]he master, in
the course of his evidence, did say that, but for his possession of radar, he probably
would not have been proceeding at the half speed at which he was proceeding."
The Sedgepool, [1956] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 668, 679. Cf. Cities Service Oil Co. v.
The S. S. Sea Wind, 242 F. 2d 368 (2d Cir. 1957). See McGovern, Head ta Head
with Radar, 14 U. S. MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 155 (1957).
' In The Anna Salen, [1954] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 475, 488, Mr. Justice Willmer
said: "It is a melancholy reflection that the collision probably would not have hap-
pened if the ships had not been equipped with radar'
'The cathode-ray tube upon the face of which the pip or echo is projected is
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absolute necessity for a clear understanding by those who use it of what
radar can and cannot do.
Despite these shortcomings, radar still remains the best anti-collision
device yet perfected. It will indicate continuous distances and bearings
of objects within range regardless of fog or other weather conditions
which might otherwise limit visibility. Yet it is this remarkable ability
to "see" in fog which alone accounts for more radar collisions than any
other factor.7  It is this reliance on radar as a lookout which tempts
the ship's master to disregard the International Rules for the Prevention
of Collisions at Sea.8
The International Rules were, of course, adopted in substantially
their present-day form long before such a thing as radar was even
thought possible.9 But after these many years of use of radar on mer-
chant ships, up to the present time the maritime experts of the world
have not deemed it wise to alter or modify the application of the Rules
in any way.'10 As for our courts which are given the responsibility of
enforcing these Rules, they have not yet shown the slightest inclina-
tion to tolerate anything but strict compliance. It may be that were
it not for the recurring examples of reckless reliance on radar resulting
in collisions, the courts would perhaps allow some relaxation in the
called the plan position indicator or PPI scope. For an elementary description of
radar and how it works, see HoRmuNG, RADAR PrimER (1948).
" Of 28 collision cases reported in England, Canada, and the United States, 21
occurred in fog, one in smoke, and three at night during wartime conditions when
the vessels were "blacked out." Only three occurred under conditions when the
two vessels could visually see each other approaching at a distance.
865 STAT. 406 (1951), 33 U.S.C. §§ 143-147d (1956).
' The International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea were agreed
to by the International Marine Conference in Washington, D. C., in 1889. They
were enacted into law in the United States on August 19, 1890, and became effective
on January 1, 1897.
"0 The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, at which all
maritime nations of the world were represented, adopted the following recommenda-
tion: "The Conference, while recognising that the recent advances in radar and
electronic navigational aids are of great service to shipping, is of the opinion that
the possession of any such device in no way relieves the master of a ship from his
obligation strictly to observe the requirements laid down in the International Reg-
ulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and in particular, the obligations con-
tained in Articles 15 and 16 of those Regulations.
"The Conference recommends that Governments should call the attention of
masters and officers to this opinion." 1953 A. M. C. 1, 83.
H. R. REP. No. 2969, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1957) states in part: "After
maritime experience in the use of radar is considerably more advanced, consideration
may well be given to changes in the International Regulations for Preventing Col-
lisions at Sea, based on the use of radar. However, such action would be pre-
mature at this time."
At the International Conference on the Use of Radar in Maritime Navigation,
held at Genoa, Italy, in May 1957, many proposals for changing the Rules or their
interpretation were submitted but rejected by the great majority of delegates. In
their place, three resolutions were adopted codifying the interpretation of some of
the Rules as presently written. Marine News, Aug. 1957, p. 25.
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interpretation of the rules, particularly Rule 16 concerning speed in fog."'
But so long as excesses are engaged in by ship handlers who point to
radar as a justification, the courts have repeatedly indicated that they
will strictly enforce the Rules in accordance with traditional interpreta-
tions. The most recent admonition came from Mr. Justice Wilimer of
the British Admiralty Court when he said :12
"This Court has said on a number of previous occasions, and I
say it again now, and I say it with the full concurrence of the
Elder Brethren, that the possession of radar is not a good excuse
for defying the Collision Regulations, or for proceeding at an in-
moderate speed in fog. It has been said more than once that
radar, like any other of these scientific instruments with which
modern ships are supplied, is an aid to navigation, and is to be
treated as such. It is not to be taken as a substitute for naviga-
tion in accordance with the Regulations." (Emphasis added.)
The Rules have also been narrowly construed in regard to provisions
other than that requiring moderate speed in fog. For example, the
second part of Rule 16 states that a vessel hearing, apparently forward
of her beam, the fog signal of another vessel "the position of which is
not ascertained" shall stop her engines.13 In the case of The Prins
"1 Rule 16, 65 STAT. 417 (1951), 33 U. S. C. § 145 n (a) (1956), provides in
part: "Every vessel, or seaplane when taxi-ing on the water, shall, in fog, mist, fall
ing snow, heavy rainstorms or any other condition similarly restricting visibility, go
at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and condi-
tions."
"Moderate speed" has been interpreted to be such speed as will enable a vessel
to stop in time to avoid a collision after the approaching vessel comes in sight,
provided the approaching vessel is herself going at the moderate speed required by
law. The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 417 (1896).
" The Miguel de I.arrinaga, [1956] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 530, 538. In The
Southport, 82 Lloyd's List L. R. 862, 872 (1949), the court said: "She is not
entitled to invoke the fact that she was fitted with radar to excuse her excessive
speed, because she failed to make any proper use of her radar." In The Prins
Alexander, [1954] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 281, 290, aff'd, [1955] 2 Lloyd's List
L. R. 1, the Court of Appeal, speaking through Lord Justice Hodson, said:
"... [T]here is nothing in the evidence on the use of radar in this case to justify
the view that the stringency of Art. 16 is to be relaxed in the case of vessels employ-
ing this aid." In Gratsos v. The Baranof, [1953] Can. Exch. 74, 81, 1953 A.M.C.
393, 400, the court said: ". . . [T]he introduction of radar as an aid to navigation
did not warrant the assumption that the international 'Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea' are by-passed or in any way changed by reason of the additional
and valuable assistance which radar provides." In The Chusan, [1955] 2 Lloyd's
List. L. R. 685, 695, the court said: "It is the fact that this equipment is supplied to
be used, and used intelligently; but I am far from saying that the use of this
equipment can be prayed in aid so as to justify navigation that would otherwise be
reckless." See also Wood v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 42 (S. D. N. Y. 1954).
Cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Union Barge Line Co., 227 F. 2d 868 (6th Cir. 1955), where the
court refused to accept another electronic device, a "Teletalk," as a substitute for
compliance with the Rule requiring a proper lookout. But see The Nora, [1956]
1 Lloyd's List L. R. 617, 624 (dictum).
1865 STAT. 417 (1951), 33 U. S. C. § 145 n (1956). The exact language is as
follows: "A power-driven vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog
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Alexander,14 the House of Lords held that the N. 0. Rigenaes which
was in collision with the Prins Alexander was not relieved of her obliga-
tion to stop after hearing the fog signals of the latter vessel even though
the Prins Alexander had been observed on the radarscope for approxi-
mately six miles. This, again, was because the Riigenaes had not prop-
erly used her radar equipment. Lord Somervell of Harrow quoted from
a case decided by Lord MacMillan' 5 as follows:
In order that the position of a vessel may be ascertained by
another vessel within the meaning of the Regulation she must
be known by that other vessel to be in such a position that both
vessels can safely proceed without risk.
And then he concluded:
It may be that proper observations on a PPI can "ascertain" the
position of a vessel in the sense explained by Lord Macmillan.
They clearly did not do so in this case so far as the N. 0.
R6genaes is concerned.
It may be, therefore, that radar, if properly used, will permit a vessel
to continue on in fog, at a moderate speed of course, even after fog
signals from another vessel have been heard ahead. This on the assump-
tion that the position of the other vessel has been "ascertained" within
the meaning of the Rule. If a collision ensues, however, the radar-
equipped vessel must bear the heavy burden of establishing that she
was making the fullest intelligent use of her equipment.
There is another related problem of "ascertainment" and that is the
changing of course by one vessel upon approaching another in fog.
A vessel in fog, hearing the signal of another vessel from such a direction
as to involve risk of collision should not alter her course blindly. 10 There
is no hard and fast rule forbidding an attempt to steer away from the
other vessel but there should be a reasonable ascertainment of the other
vessel's approximate position and probable course before helm action
is taken. The courts so far have been reluctant to permit any such
change of course made in reliance upon radar information,'1 but this
has been because in 'each case the radar equipment was used improperly
signal of a vessel the position of which is not ascertained, shall, so far as the cir-
cumstances of the case admit, stop her engines, and then navigate with caution
until danger of collision is over."
[1955] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 1.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. China Navigation Co., [1935] A. C. 177, 182
(P. C.).
10 GRDIN, CoLLIsiox, § 129 (1949); MARSDEN, CoLLIsioNs AT SEA, 395, 489
(10th ed. 1953) ; see The Chusan, [1952] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 685.
"'The Nora, [1956] Lloyd's List L. R. 617; The Anna Salen, [1954] 1 Lloyd's
List L. R. 475; The Dagmar Salen v. Puget Sound Navigation Co., [1951] Can.
Sup. Ct. 608, 4 D. L. R. 1 (1951), 1951 A. M. C. 1253.
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and negligently. There is every reason to believe that if the information
supplied by radar is correctly and intelligently interpreted the courts
will permit a change of course in fog based upon such information.'8
Although radar does not justify excessive speed in fog, a ship in
collision will nevertheless be at fault if she has failed to use her radar.'9
This is no more than is required of every good seaman at sea 20 He must
utilize all the means at his disposal to navigate safely and carefully and
if he does not, and such failure results in collision, his vessel will be held
to blame. However, if visibility is good and there is no reason to suspect
fog2 ' or if the radar is not delivering accurate information2 2 the courts
have held that there is no duty to use the radar.
23
On the other hand, if radar is used, it must be used properly and
intelligently. The courts are unanimous in this requirement. 24  This
1" See Miguel de Larrinaga, [1956] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 530.
"'The Medford, 65 F. Supp. 622 (E. D. N. Y. 1946), 21 TUL. L. REv. 106,
32 CoRNEL L. Q. 570 (1947), 33 VA. L. REv. 71 (1947); The Esso Plymouth,
[1955] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 429. In The Indus, [1957] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 335,
the court held a vessel to blame for not using radar facilities maintained on the
River Mersey, radar information being radioed to ships requesting it. See also The
Tynwald, [1953] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 271.
"Rule 29, 65 STAT. 419 (1951), 33 U. S. C. § 147a (1956), provides in part:
"Nothing in... [these rules] shall exonerate any vessel or the owner or master or
crew thereof, from the consequences . . . of the neglect of any precaution which
may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances
of the case."
-" British Transport Comm'n v. United States, 230 F. 2d 139 (4th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 354 U. S. 129 (1957). But see Oliver J. Olson & Co. v. The Marine Leopard,
152 F. Supp. 197 (N. D. Cal. 1957).
"Pocahontas Steamship Co. v. The Esso Aruba, 94 F. Supp. 486, 490 (D. C.
Mass. 1950), where the court said: "There might well be times when the continued
use of radar by a navigator who was uncertain of the results he was observing and
unwilling to place reliance thereon might well be foolhardy and hazardous. There
should be a certain discretion allowed competent and experienced ship-handlers to
use or not use radar as the circumstances of the moment require."
. The question of whether a vessel will be held at fault for negligent failure
to keep her radar equipment in g6od repair has never been decided. Only one
case has been found which touches on the subject and there the court said: "At
this point it is well to refer to the Duke's radar. Its use would have avoided the
collision and its unavailableness was due to neglect of repair. There was ample
warning-a day or two-of its disrepair. Had it been in operation, the situation so
urgently demanding its services, omission to use it would clearly have been
negligence. However, as the Duke of York's excessive speed was the pre-dom-
inant fault leading to collision, it is not necessary in this case to pass upon the
question of whether or not, in the absence of statute requiring radar, a lack of
diligence in maintaining existing radar facilities is negligence." Petition of United
States, 131 F. Supp. 712, 717 (E. D. Va. 1955), aff'd sub noin., British Transport
Comm'n v. United States, 230 F. 2d 139 (4th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 354 U. S. 129
(1957).
2' United States v. S. S. Washington, 241 F. 2d 819 (4th Cir. 1957); United
States v. The Australia Star, 172 F. 2d 472 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S.
823 (1949) ; The Robert L. Holt, [1956] 2 Lloyd's List. L. R. 337; The Chusan,
[1955] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 685; The Southport, 82 Lloyd's List L. R. 862 (1949).
In The Dagmar Salen v. Puget Sound Navigation Co., [1951] Can. Sup. Ct. 608,
612, 4 D. L. R. 1, 4 (1951), 1951 A.M.C. 1253, 1257, the court said: "If radar is to
furnish a new sight through fog, then the report which it brings must be interpreted
by active and constant intelligence on the part of the operator." And in The Anna
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
means a careful analysis of the movements of other vessels observed on
the radarscope. In certain cases a physical plot may be required.25 As
was recently said by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the case of Polarus Steamship Co. v. The T/S Sandefjord :20
There were a number of other factors, such as . ..the failure
of those in command of the Sandefjord to make proper use of her
radar. Indeed, what happened here demonstrates how radar may,
when not properly used, increase the chances of collision. Had
successive observations been plotted to determine the course and
speed of the Polarusoil, which was plainly visible on the radar
screen when about seven miles away, the ships would probably
have passed one another in safety. But the master of the Sand-
efjord .made no such calculations; he merely guessed that the
Polarusoil was steering a course parallel to the coastline and
moving to the left of the Sandefjord. While a matter of con-
jecfure, it seems not unlikely that the Sandefjord would have
proceeded more cautiously had she not been equipped with radar,
which, under the circumstances, gave a false sense of security.
This failure carefully to analyze radar information can have two harmful
effects. First, it may result in the deck watch officer's acting on incom-
plete and, perhaps, even erroneous information. Second, it deprives the
radar operator of the opportunity to appreciate and understand the
principles of relative motion. Without this understanding there is great
Salen, [1954] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 475, 488, Mr. Justice Willmer said: "These
scientific installations and particularly radar, are potentially most valuable instru-
ments for increasing safety at sea; but they only remain valuable if they are in-
telligently used, and if the officers responsible for working them work them and in-
terpret them with intelligence. That is only another way, I think, of saying that a
good look-out must be maintained. A good look-out involves not only the use of
ears, but it also involves the intelligent interpretation of the data received by way of
these various scientific instruments. This collision ought never to have happened,
and certainly would not have happened if both vessels had made intelligent use of
the scientific instruments with which they were equipped."
"Plotting has been encouraged for all ships' deck officers for many years by
leading writers on the subject. For a recent example, see Thayer, Plot-For
Safety, 14 U. S. MERCHANT MARINaE CouNcIL PROCEEDINGS 52 (1957).
.e236 F. 2d 270, 271 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 982 (1957) ; accord,
Oliver J. Olson & Co. v. The Marine Leopard, 152 F. Supp. 197 (N. D. Cal. 1957) ;
The Guildford, [1956] P. 364, [1956] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 74; The Prins Alexander,
[1955]- 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 1. In The Guildford, supra at 80, Lord Merriman
said: "If the second officer had done what he admitted that he knew to be his duty,
and had taken continuous observations and plotted them, he would have known, not
merely that a vessel was coming nearer to him, as indicated by successive distances
on the radar, but that she was a vessel which was closing him on a bearing which
was substantially unchanged." In Oliver J. Olson & Co. v. The Marine Leopard,
supra at 205; the court said: ". . . [I]f either had taken the trouble to plot the
course of the other by radar, the fact that there was a risk of collision would have
been all the more apparent to both and corresponding adjustments in course could
have..,bee..made.", See .also The Nora, [1956] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 617.
[Vol. 36
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danger of confusing relative motion with true motion,- and such con-
fusion can be fatal when two ships are approaching each other at sea.
Furthermore, through a close study of these concepts of motion, the
watch officer can develop fine analytical sense or "seaman's eye" which
will enable him to quickly evaluate a risk of collision and to make the
appropriate manoeuvre.
From what has already been said it would appear that radar imposes
additonal responsibilities and duties on a ship. This is true. 8  Since
radar warns of another ship's presence before she would ordinarily be
detected and, further, will enable an accurate determination of her course
and speed, it seems obvious that good seamanship will require that the
radar-equipped vessel navigate with regard to this information so as to
avoid any risk of collision.2 9  Indeed, such extra responsibility would
7 On the PPI scope commonly found on merchantmen today, the position of
one's own ship, that is, the ship upon which the radar is installed, always appears
in the center and is stationary. All objects detected by the radar will, therefore,
move relatively to the center of the scope. But such are not the true movements of
the objects because they embody components consisting of the movements of one's
own ship. Thus, the navigator must compensate for his own ship's course and
speed before any meaningful information is derived.
Some radar manufacturers have recently introduced models for use on merchant-
men -which will automatically make these computations, projecting own ship onto
the screen as a spot of light moving on its true course at its true speed. All.de-
tected objects will appear to move or remain stationary according to their actual
movements. Advertisement in Fairplay, March 28, 1957, p. 813; Marine News,
Aug. 1957, p. 24; The New York Times, Sept. 24, 1957, p. 69, col. 4. Such advance-
ments, while of great assistance in certain circumstances, do not relieve the watch
officer of the necessity for understanding the capabilities of radar as previously
mentioned. Nor do they dispense with the necessity for acquiring a knowledge of
the concepts of relative and true motion. This knowledge is essential regardless of
radar since, to the watch officer at sea, looking from the bridge at an approaching
vessel, his own ship appears to be stationary. He must always either mentally, if
he has developed that "seaman's eye" or, if circumstances permit, physically by
making an actual plot, determine, at least roughly, the other ship's true course and
speed.
"8 The Medford, 65 F. Supp. 622 (E. D. N. Y. 1946); The Sedgepool, [1956] 2
Lloyd's List L. R. 668. In The Sedgepool, supra at 679, Mr. Justice Willmer said:
"An instrument such as radar is supplied to be used, and I think its very possession
does impose some additional duty on the vessel fortunate enough to be equipped
with it." And again, in The Nora, [1956] 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 617, 626, Mr.
Justice Willmer said: ". . . [T]he possession of this radar equipment gives the
Westerdam a great advantage over other vessels which are not similarly equipped;
but it brings with it, in my judgment, a concurrent duty to see that intelligent and
reasonable use is made of the equipment provided. If she makes a mistake, being
so much better equipped than the Nora, so much the less does she have an excuse
for doing so."
2 There are also three cases, the first two involving wartime convoy conditions,
which impose upon the radar-equipped ship a duty to try to warn another vessel
if she observes her standing into danger. United States v. The Australia Star, 172
F. 2d 472 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 823 (1949) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 830 (E. D. Mich. 1954) ; The Sobieski,
[1949] P. 313, 82 Lloyd's List L. R 370 (1948). In a more recent case, United
States v. S. S. Washington, 241 F. 2d 819 (4th Cir. 1957), the court explained
that such a duty arises only if the vessel in collision is under the control of the
other radar-equipped vessel or its commanding officer as distinguished from the
control of a group commander who happens to be using that other vessel as his
19571
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follow the installation of any other electronic device designed to assist
navigation. But, the shipowner might well ask, then, if radar is such an
extra burden, why install it in the first place? The answer is that radar-
equipped vessels, although charged with additional duties, enjoy the
use of a navigational aid which, if used properly, can greatly increase
their safety. This safety factor far more than offsets any extra responsi-
bilities which may be imposed. There can be no question that this
instrument which enables seamen to see in fog and in the dark is
essentially the means by which collisions at sea can and should be
reduced, if not .eliminated. To blame radar for the shortcomings of those
who use it would indeed be a backward step. 0
No country in the world presently requires sea-going vessels to be
equipped with radar. Nor has any court decision been found which holds
a vessel at fault for failure to carry radar. To the contrary, in the case
of Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v. United States3l the court said that
"The failure of the Wilkes to carry navigational radar did not make it
unseaworthy." It is, however, true that that case involved a collision
which occurred in 1942 when radar was still in its infancy. Eventually,
when radar has proven itself the great navigational aid we know it to
be, and when it is readily available to all merchantmen at a relatively low
cost, the courts might very well change their position and require its
installation.
Such was the history of radio. In the case of The T. J. Hooper,
82
Judge Learned Hand held a vessel unseaworthy because she was not
equipped with a radio receiver even though there was no law requiring
it at the time and even though there was no custom among that type
of vessel to use such equipment. 3 Of course, since 1928, when that
flag ship. And in United States v. Adrastus, 190 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1951), it was
held that the escort vessel's negligence in failing to relay radar information to the
convoy vessel could not be attributed to that convoy vessel. See for a brief dis-
cussion of this subject 55 MIcH. L. Rav. 582 (1957).
11 In The Hindoo, 74 F. Supp. 145, 149 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), modified on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Australia Star, 172 F. 2d 472, cert. denied,
338 U. S. 823 (1949), the court said: "It has been suggested that to hold the
Australia Star at fault is to penalize her because of her equipment with radar. That
is a misconception. The conduct which is regarded as negligent on the part of
a person of sound vision is not the same as that which is condemned when practiced
by the blind. The fault of the Australia Star is that she chose to remain blind
when she had the means to see."
" 88 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. C. Mass. 1950).
3260 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
"Judge Hand said: "There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make
the general practice of the callihg the standard of proper diilgence .... Indeed
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." Id.
at 740.
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marine casualty occurred, the maritime countries of the world have
entered into treaties34 requiring vessels to carry not only radio but radio
direction finders. Furthermore, the United States as well as other coun-
tries have statutes making it unlawful for certain vessels to put to sea
without such equipment.35
Radar probably has a long way to go before it reaches the level of
importance now attached to radio. It may be that by compact, confer-
ence or other international agreement, all seagoing vessels will be obli-
gated to carry radar. Such a step would undoubtedly be followed by
statutory requirements. Until that day, however, or until radar is so
well established that it will be recognized in court as an essential aid to
navigation, a vessel will not be at fault for failing to carry such equip-
ment.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the cases involving radar collisions leads to but
one conclusion. Too many of those who are charged with the responsi-
bility of navigating vessels at sea not only fail to understand and properly
interpret the information which radar gives them but they compound
that failure by regarding radar as a sort of navigational wizard worthy
of their greatest trust, something even its manufacturers would not ad-
vocate. It is not difficult to see how radar, if put into the hands of those
who do not know how to properly use it, can be a trap, an invitation
to destruction. Indeed, this is the principal cause of the collisions in
fog which in recent years have grown increasingly in number.
There appears to be only one solution to this problem. The deck
officer of a seagoing ship must be fully qualified before he can be per-
mitted to use radar at sea. The maritime nations of the world, recog-
nizing their duty to protect lives and property, can and should refuse
to grant a license to any merchant marine deck officer unless he has
demonstrated that he understands and knows how to use this equip-
ment. 6 When this has been done we can expect with some assurance
"International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, May 31, 1929, arts.
27, 47, 50 STAT. 1121, T. S. No. 910; International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, June 10, 1948, [1952] 3 U. S. TFATrEs & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS
3450, T. I. A. S. No. 2495.
" 68 STAT. 704 (1954), 47 U. S. C. § 351 (1956), originally enacted June 19, 1934.
Former 46 U. S. C. § 484, now incorporated in 47 U. S. C. § 351, was enacted in 1910
and also required certain vessels to carry radio. But the vessel (a tugboat) in The
T. J. Hooper, 60 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), was not covered by that statute. There-
fore, when the Hooper case was decided there was already a federal statute re-
quiring at least some vessels to carry radio, unlike the situation today in regard to
radar.
" In 1956 the United Kingdom took such action and there are probably other
nations which have enacted such requirements. Ministry of Transport and Civil
Aviation Notice No. M.404, Nov. 1956. To date, no similar action has been taken
in the United States, although the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commandant
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that the number of collisions will decrease and that at last radar will
prove itself and be accepted as an invaluable aid to navigation.
of the Coast Guard have ample statutory power to issue a regulation embodying
such a requirement. 60 STAT. 1097, 46 U. S. C. § 224 (1946) ; 63 STAT. 544, 14
U. S. C. § 631 (1949) ; 63 STAT. 545, 14 U. S. C. § 633 (1949).
The courts have looked favorably on programs for training in the use of radar.
See Stranding & Loss of S. S. Princess Kathleen, 1953 A. M. C. 392 (Can. Ex.
Ct), where the court said: "Although the question of radar was not in issue here,
we note with satisfaction the action of the Department of Transport in providing
schools for instructions of ships' officers in its use, as recommended by this Court
at its last sitting."
